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ABSTRACT 
 
Contemporary African agricultural policy embodies the African Green Revolution’s 
drive towards modernisation and commercialisation. Agroecologists have criticised this 
movement on ecological, social and political grounds. Northern Ghanaian fertiliser credit 
schemes provide a good example through which these critiques can be examined in a 
context where agricultural policy reflects the African Green Revolution’s ideals. This 
study aimed to determine the relationship of such credit schemes to farmers’ use of 
organic amendments, elucidate other factors related to organic amendment use, and 
comment on the relevance of this modernisation policy and its relationship to 
agroecology. A first research phase employed semi-structured key informant interviews. 
Qualitative data from these informed construction of a semi-structured questionnaire that 
was used in a survey of 205 farmers. Multistage sampling purposively identified five 
villages and selected farmers within who had joined government and donor-funded 
fertiliser credit schemes. The use of organic and inorganic amendments was compared to 
that of peers who had not taken part in such schemes. Quantitative data were used in 
binomial logistic regression, inferential and descriptive statistics. Qualitative data were 
content analysed. Credit group membership was associated with higher fertiliser 
application and yield, but had little influence on the extent of commercialisation. Farmers 
who applied organic amendments were 40% less likely to belong to a fertiliser credit 
scheme than not, indicating substitution between organic and inorganic fertilisers. 
Organic amendments were 40% more likely to be applied to compound farms than 
outfields and six times more likely to be applied by household heads than other household 
members. However, household heads also preferentially joined credit groups. This was 
part of an agroecological soil fertility management strategy. Household heads 
appreciated the soil moisture retention properties of organic amendments, and applied 
them to compound farms to reduce risk to their household food supply in a semi-arid 
environment. They simultaneously accessed fertiliser to enhance this household 
provisioning strategy. They appreciated the increased yields this achieved, yet 
complained that the repayment terms of credit schemes were unfair, fertiliser did not 
enhance yields in dry conditions and fertilisers were supplied late. Farmers’ use of 
credited fertiliser alongside their existing agroecological strategy is helpful to the extent 
that it raises yields, yet is problematic in that it conflicts with risk-reduction strategies 
based on organics. There is some potential for modernised and agroecological 
management paradigms to coexist. For fertiliser credit to play a role in this, schemes 
must use fairer repayment terms and involve a focus on simultaneous use of organic 
amendments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
African agriculture has been commercialised and modernised in the 21st century. This is 
typified by the African Green Revolution movement, which aims at increasing yields 
through modern technologies [1]. These ambitions are reflected in policy, for example 
the 2015 renewal of the African Union’s 2003 Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Programme. However, critiques of this development endeavour echo the 
controversy that surrounded the 1960s Asian Green Revolution, highlighting the social 
impacts of introducing new agricultural technologies without appropriate financial and 
institutional support [2]. For example, credit is posited as dangerous, in that it risks 
indebting farmers [3]. Environmental sustainability is another concern, with fears that 
long-term inorganic fertiliser use prevents soil organic matter regeneration as farmers 
abandon organic amendments, and that high-input agricultural regimes raise risks of crop 
failure [3, 4, 5].  
 
Such concerns invoke an agroecological management paradigm. The science of 
agroecology considers interactions between ecological, social, political and economic 
elements of agricultural systems. Agroecology is simultaneously a political movement, 
promoting farmers’ rights and advocating organic methods [6]. Political agroecologists 
consider that the African Green Revolution involves a simplistic, technology-driven 
development agenda based on an outdated modernisation paradigm, and criticise 
‘attempts to co-opt agroecology into the Green Revolution’, claiming that it threatens 
food sovereignty [7].  
 
African Green Revolution proponents have attempted to deflect such critiques. The 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), for example, incorporates 
institutional and financial innovations into its ‘Innovative Financing’ and ‘Market 
Access’ programs, intending to help farmers adopt technology and commercialise 
without becoming indebted [8]. Linked to this, credit has been disbursed by states, NGOs 
and private ventures, often in Public-Private Partnerships. 
 
This study, therefore, assesses the relevance of these agroecological critiques of the 
African Green Revolution through a case study of northern Ghanaian fertiliser credit 
schemes. This permits examination of how modernist and agroecological management 
paradigms interact in a current development context. Fertiliser credit schemes are a 
particularly appropriate case example for this, because they involve ecological, financial 
and social elements, whilst embodying one of the African Green Revolution’s central 
technologies - Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM) [9]. This advocates use of a 
mixture of inorganic and organic fertilisers and improved germplasm, with inorganic 
fertiliser as the entry point to improved soil fertility management. Integrated Soil Fertility 
Management recognises the synergistic and non-substitutable effects of organic and 
inorganic fertilisers [10]. It is also understood that local knowledge and institutional and 
socio-political elements are integral to effective soil management [3, 11]. 
 
Northern Ghana was an appropriate setting for this study because Ghanaian agricultural 
policy reflects African Green Revolution ideals. The 2009 Northern Regional Growth 
Programme, supported by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the 
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2012 USAID-funded Ghana Commercial Agriculture Programme both assume that 
access to markets and credit will increase Northern smallholders’ food security. The 
Agricultural Value Chain Mentorship Project, a Public-Private Partnership, aims to ‘link 
farmers to commercial banks to access capital through loans’ [12]. Out-grower models 
include the Ghana Grains Partnership between the Government, fertiliser wholesalers 
Wienco and Yara, their smallholder cooperative Masara N’Arziki and the broker 
Prorustica [13]. In 2013 the Ghana Grains Council implemented a warehouse inventory 
receipt system, in which farmers use stored grain as loan collateral. 
 
Northern Ghana has a particularly strong agricultural tradition. Agriculture employs over 
70% of the regional labour force [14] and its form reflects patterns common across 
Africa. The main staple is maize, often intercropped with groundnuts, the major cash 
crop. Household heads of the patriarchal Dagomba ethnic group (henceforth ‘landlords’) 
combine crops and livestock on holdings of two to ten acres. They are responsible for 
providing maize to their households [15]. Junior men (‘nachimbihi’) grow groundnuts, 
rice and vegetables for cash. Northern Ghanaian agriculture is, nevertheless, still largely 
semi-subsistence and nachimbihi assist landlords on household farms before attending to 
their own. Landlords and nachimbihi also use paid and reciprocal labour. 
 
The Guinea savanna climate has one rainy season of 4-6 months, within which 
precipitation can be unpredictable. Soils in the study region are sandy with organic matter 
content typically below 2% [16]. Soil fertility is, therefore, low and maize fertilisation, 
usually with compound and ammonia fertilisers, is considered essential. However, 
despite subsidisation between 2008 and 2015, the cost remains a constraint. As 
mentioned, exclusive inorganic application means topsoil organic matter does not 
regenerate thus reducing soil moisture retention capacity. Some farmers, therefore, use 
organic amendments, mostly manure and compost. This is constrained by limited 
availability and transportation difficulties, so organics are applied mostly to compound 
or ‘sambanni’ farms close to the homesteads, rather than to more remote outfields, as is 
common across West Africa [17]. Farmers occasionally use other techniques such as 
mulching and, rarely, fallowing. 
 
Strategies reflecting Green Revolution discourses are emerging in the study villages. 
Credit is available through the Ministry of Agriculture (MOFA) and various NGOs, 
notably Campaign for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), supported in 2012 
by the Millennium Development Agency (MiDA), the Ghana ‘compact’ of the USA’s 
Millennium Challenge Corporation. The Millennium Development Agency made funds 
available to the Bank of Ghana, which selected and disbursed cash to implementers such 
as CARD. Both the MOFA and MiDA/CARD schemes worked through farmer groups. 
There have been calls for examination of the effect of such modernisation and 
commercialisation endeavours on soil fertility management at local scales [11, 18]. In 
order to address this issue, this study posed the following research questions: 
 
1. Do farmers who are members of credit schemes achieve higher yields or sell a higher 
proportion of their goods? 
2. Is scheme membership associated with a difference in application of organic and 
inorganic amendments?  
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3. Which factors other than credit scheme membership influence organic and inorganic 
fertiliser application? 




Fieldwork took place 25km north of the Northern Ghanaian regional capital, Tamale, 
between January and March 2012. 
 
Sampling 
Multistage sampling was done at district, community and individual levels. Two districts, 
Kumbungu and Savelugu-Nanton, were selected from the Northern maize producing 
districts. These districts are close enough to the large city, Tamale, for input and output 
markets to function, facilitating examination of commercialisation. A spatial cluster of 
five accessible communities was identified where farmers had participated in credit 
schemes (see Figure 1). This kept agroecological and cultural characteristics of the 
sample fairly homogenous, as variation in these was not the main focus. The last 
sampling level involved maize farmers. The sampling procedure at this level differed for 
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Figure 1: Study site location (Source: Survey of Ghana, updated 2015 from Google 
Earth) 
 
Data collection and tool design 
At the farmer level, respondents for semi-structured interviews were purposively 
sampled in a first research stage. These interviews sought qualitative data on the opinions 
and experiences of key respondents on fertilisation, commercialisation and credit [19]. 
In Zugu, Satani and Tarakpaa, these were contact farmers from the Millennium 
Development Agency and Ministry of Agriculture schemes. Employees from MiDA and 
one from CARD were also interviewed, alongside three from MOFA. Interview topic 
guides focused on scheme aims and operation; interviewee’s opinions of their efficacy 
and drawbacks, and factors they considered influenced farmers’ soil fertility 
management practice. 
 
The second research stage involved a structured survey of 205 farmers, collecting their 
answers to specific questions about their fertilisation practice [20]. Here, a sampling 
procedure resembling the ‘nearest neighbour’ method was used. Credit group members 
were contacted through group chairmen and matched to others who were not members 
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on the basis of approximate age, household size and household role [21, 22]. Those non-
scheme members were recruited through household visits, where verbal consent was 
obtained. The farmers sampled for the survey comprised approximately five percent of 
the population of the five villages, based on an estimate of approximately 20 household 
members in each house in the communities (see Table 2). Table 1 gives numbers of 
farmers sampled in each village.  
 
Interview data from the first research stage informed the design of the survey 
questionnaire, particularly the identification of variables that could influence the use of 
organic amendments. The first section detailed respondents’ demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics. The second asked for the number of bags of different 
types of fertiliser from different sources they had applied to each of their fields. Thirdly, 
the output of each field was ascertained and other soil fertility management strategies 
listed. In the final section, respondents gave their opinions about fertiliser and credit 
schemes.  
 
During pre-testing, farmers could not state financial incomes or expenditures. An asset 
index is more appropriate in such situations where consumption of household produce 
dominates [23]. For ease of construction, an additive index was used, summing together 
the number of assets respondents could access from a list of relevant items. The list 
avoided assets that, in this context, were homogenous, including access to water and 
healthcare. Weighting assets equally is problematic [24], so several were kept scalar 
rather than being converted to dummies. Others were weighted based on the results of 
qualitative interviews and observations in the study context, as price data was not 
consistent [25]. Thus, cattle, motorbikes and tractors, expensive, elite goods, were 
weighted with 2 and 3. The first section of the questionnaire was redesigned to facilitate 






Analysis began with binomial logistic regression and Mann-Whitney U tests, performed 
with SPSS 16. These indicated differences in yield, commercialisation and use of organic 
amendments between farmers who did and did not belong to credit groups, addressing 
research questions 1 and 2.  
 
Asset index = number of small ruminants + (number of cattle x 2) + household 
cattle ownership (dummy) + personal landholding (acres) + bicycle ownership 
(dummy) + alternative employment (dummy) + zinc roof (dummy) + (dummy 
for motorbike ownership x 2) + (dummy for tractor ownership x 3) + number 
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The logit model used is 
         [equation 2] [26] 
 
so here 
             [equation 3] 
 
 
where the dependent variable P is the probability that a farmer belongs to a credit group. 
The independent variables x1 to x5 are the number of bags of fertiliser they applied, the 
percentage of their output they consumed, the percentage they sold, their yield per 
household member, and a dummy indicating whether a farmer applied organic 
amendments at all.  
 
Addressing research question 3, a second binomial logistic regression was used to 
indicate which variables, identified from interviews and literature, were associated with 
use of organic amendments on specific fields. This had the same form as in equation 2. 
The dependent variable is the probability of applying organic amendments. The 
independent variables x1 to x6 are four dummy variables indicating whether the field is a 
sambanni or an outfield, whether the farmer is a member of a fertiliser credit group, 
whether they are a landlord and whether they own a bicycle; and two scalar variables 
indicating their score on the asset index and the number of animals they own. 
 
The comments and statements that farmers made in the qualitative section and in 
conversation were coded. Farmers made unambiguous statements that were assigned to 




Table 2 details demographic characteristics of the sample. Parameters relating to the 
wealth of the sampled respondents are given in Table 3. Maize farmers were 
overwhelmingly male, with some livestock keeping and additional employment. Asset 
ownership was positively skewed. 
 
Seventy-three percent of respondent credit scheme members were receiving credit from 
CARD. At harvest, farmers repaid in cash or maize with a bag of compound fertiliser 
being worth 1.5 sacks of maize and farmers repaying a bag of ammonia with a single 
sack of maize. The sanction for non-repayment was non-eligibility to borrow again. 





] =∝0+ 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖  , … , 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖 + µ𝑖  
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using the same repayment rates, but with no sanction for non-repayment. The remaining 
eight percent had either borrowed privately or from one of four groups, associated with 
the NGOs Community Action Programme for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural 
Development and Adventist Development and Relief Agency or with local cotton and 
mango outgrowers. 
 
Credit, yield and commercialisation 
Binomial logistic regression answered the first research question of whether probability 
of being in a credit scheme was associated with raised yields or commercialisation. The 
initial -2 log likelihood was 282.78 and the -2 log likelihood at step 1 was 251.61, giving 
a model chi-square of 31.17 (d.f.=5, p=0.000). The Nagelkerke R2 was 0.189 and 70.1% 
of cases were predicted correctly, compared to 50.5% in the null model. Table 4 gives 
coefficients of the independent variables.  
 
Farmers who produced higher yields per household member were more likely to be credit 
group members. However, selling a higher proportion of their crops did not mean a 
farmer was more likely to belong to a credit group. Farmers who consumed a higher 
proportion of their maize were slightly less likely to be group members. Coefficients 
close to 1 for these two latter variables indicate that being in a credit group had little 
effect on farmers’ commercial orientation. Farmers described how the sales they did 
make occurred within four months of harvesting, before prices began to rise towards the 
next farming season. Table 5 shows that group members did receive a higher mean maize 
price. This was due to two farmers who transported their maize to Techiman, 200km 
southwards, receiving up to 85 Ghana Cedis (GHS) (44.2 USD in March 2012) per sack 
compared to their colleagues’ mean of 52 GHS (27.0 USD). 
 
Farmers, and especially landlords, were subsistence oriented. Table 6 displays farmers’ 
comments that indicated most perceived maize as a subsistence crop. 
 
Credit and Soil Fertility Management 
Answering question 2, Table 4 shows that a higher probability of scheme membership 
was associated with higher fertiliser application but not with organic amendment use. 
Group members used less borrowed fertiliser and bought less fertiliser (Table 5). Farmers 
were substituting the fertiliser they borrowed for organic amendments. 
 
Household role, farm position and Soil Fertility Management 
Detailed data collected at individual field level were used in the second binomial logistic 
regression to answer the third question of which farmer and field factors other than credit 
scheme membership influence organic fertiliser application. The initial -2 log likelihood 
was 321.69 and the -2 log likelihood at step 1 was 270.45, giving a model chi-square of 
51.24 (d.f.=6, p=0.000). The Nagelkerke R2 was 0.242 and 79.9% of cases were predicted 
correctly, compared to 75.3% in the null model. Table 7 gives coefficients of the 
independent variables. 
 
Field location was most strongly related to the probability a field received organic 
amendments. Landlords, the male household heads, were also more likely to apply 
organics than junior household members, as were farmers who scored higher on the asset 
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index. Transport was one component of that index facilitating organic application [27]. 
However, merely owning a bicycle was not associated with higher probability of organic 
application. As nachimbihi are more likely to own bicycles than landlords, bicycle 
ownership most likely acted here as an indication of junior household position. Similarly, 
animal ownership did not increase the probability that a farmer would apply organics. 
These two results indicate that it was more the landlords’ food provisioning responsibility 
than access to transport and animal ownership that encouraged them to use organics. The 
negative association between credit group membership and application of organic 
amendments further substantiates the suggestion that farmers substituted subsidised 
inorganic fertiliser for organic amendments.  
 
Examining household role reveals some of the relationships between group membership, 
inorganic and organic fertilisation and commercial or subsistence orientation. Almost 
42% of landlords as opposed to 17.7% of nachimbihi used organics. However, landlords 
also preferentially used fertiliser credit: 55% of the credit group members sampled were 
landlords, whereas a census performed by the author in Yipielgu village in 2009 showed 
that just 24% of adult males were landlords. 
 
Further statistics confirmed the importance of spatial location in farmers’ fertilisation 
strategies. Solely organic amendments were applied to 39.5% of sambanni fields and just 
2.4% of outfields. Conversely, fertiliser alone was applied to 74.7% of outfields and 
30.2% of compound farms. Half of those who applied organic amendments to their own 
fields rotated their application either within or between them, generally annually. Six 
percent of the sample practiced such rotation on a household scale. In addition, 83% of 
all farmers used crop rotation, 56% of those between the fields of all farmers in the 
household. 
 
These spatial management strategies were little altered by access to fertiliser credit. 
Neither bought nor borrowed fertiliser was preferentially applied to in- or outfields. 
Nearly 91% of fields receiving borrowed fertiliser were outfields, not significantly more 
than the 86% of fields that received bought fertiliser. Both infields and outfields fertilised 
with borrowed fertiliser were very slightly and not significantly less likely to receive 
organics than those fertilised with bought fertiliser alone or a mixture of the two. 
 
Farmers’ opinions 
Addressing research question 4, on farmers’ opinions, Table 8 shows that over 90% 
appreciated that fertiliser credit improved yields. They had ecological, logistical and 
financial concerns. 
 
Farmers considered inorganics risky in an environment with low rainfall and soil fertility 
and explained that timely fertiliser application was critical for high yields. When the 
Campaign for Agricultural and Rural Development realised that funds would not arrive 
from the Bank of Ghana in time for the start of the season, they purchased fertiliser 
themselves, trusting the bank to repay them. Nevertheless, many farmers complained that 
the fertiliser had arrived too late. Ministry of Agriculture officials said that this complaint 
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Farmers’ financial concerns deserve explanation. Repayment of bags of ammonia 
fertiliser with one sack of maize and compound fertiliser with 1.5 sacks has been 
described. In 2012, bags of subsidised compound were sold on the market for 39 GHS 
(20.3 USD) and ammonia for 35 GHS (18.2 USD). Sacks of maize used for repayment 
were, therefore, worth between 26 GHS (13.5 USD) and 35 GHS (18.2 USD), compared 
to the average of 52 GHS (27.0 USD) farmers earned when they sold a sack of maize on 
the market. Having spent all their cash on other farming costs, especially tractor hire 
earlier in the season, the majority of farmers repaid in maize. The losses they incurred in 
doing so meant that fertiliser use was not profitable for them: in 2012, the farmers 
participating in the survey lost on average 103.28 GHS (53.7 USD) by using maize for 
fertiliser repayment rather than selling it on the market. The benefits of increased yield 





Mixed support for the African Green Revolution 
The answer to research question 1 partially supports African Green Revolution 
narratives. Farmers who access credited fertiliser have less need to buy and borrow 
fertiliser elsewhere. They apply more overall, so achieve higher yields, as has been found 
elsewhere [28]. Here, credit does not increase the likelihood of commercialisation 
overall. Of those selling their maize, just two transported it outside the local area in order 
to raise its value. Most respondents stated they did not see maize as a commercial crop, 
and as these sales took place less than four months after harvest, it is more likely that 
many sold immediately to repay farming debts. This substantiates the idea that some, but 
not all, elements of the African Green Revolution are taking root in the study site.  
 
As farmers see themselves as subsistence oriented, a change in their self-perception 
would be necessary to effect a switch to the African Green Revolution model of 
commercial trade and profit maximization. Many households here commercialise only 
after food security is guaranteed, largely because the current subsistence system deals 
better with risk.  
 
Subsistence risk reduction mechanisms 
These farmers already have an agroecological soil fertility management system that 
reduces risk, revealed through spatial field level data: farm location and household role 
were more strongly linked to use of organic amendments than credit group membership 
was. In a pattern found across West Africa, landlords preferentially apply organic 
amendments to compound farms, requiring less labour than carrying them to outfields 
[17]. They are the most appropriate people to take responsibility for this due to their 
control over family labour. Preferentially applying organics to compound farms can 
potentially deplete nutrient levels in outfields [29]. Farmers in the study area attempted 
to avoid such effects by rotating organic application between their outfields and 
compound fields. 
 
Landlords have hitherto used organic amendments because they have a specific 
ecological importance in reducing drought risk, as they improve soil structure and 
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moisture retention capacity [30]. This is especially significant in this erratic rainfall 
environment, confirmed by farmers’ recognition of inorganic fertilisers’ uselessness in 
drought. Landlords’ use of organic amendments thus illustrates the African smallholders’ 
propensity towards risk minimisation, also noted in Northern Ghanaian farmers’ 
preference for landrace maize varieties [4]. The significant relationships between 
applying organic amendments, eating a higher proportion of their maize and selling a 
significantly lower proportion of it further demonstrates landlords’ subsistence 
orientation. Inorganic fertiliser is another tool landlords can use to fulfil their household 
provisioning responsibilities, and accessing a credit groups supports this. 
 
Problems associated with fertiliser credit schemes 
Fertiliser credit, however, is used at the expense of organic-based risk reducing 
strategies. This is potentially problematic considering the ecological importance farmers 
afforded organics. Farmers’ concern about the untimely supply of credited fertiliser 
related to their understanding of its agroecological function. They emphasised that 
fertilisers had to be applied on time to be useful, yet most were unable to achieve this 
due to the failure of the state and partnership mechanisms to deliver promptly. 
 
Although this study did not aim to directly address issues of inequality, farmers raised 
them. The perceived unfair repayment rates of the credit schemes led some to echo 
critical authors’ concerns that the African Green Revolution’s underlying motivation is 
profit-making for input suppliers, and that Green Revolution technologies accentuate 
existing inequalities [5]. The wealthiest farmers encountered avoided the schemes. They 
argued that this advantaged them, as they were not indebted and could sell maize and 
obtain fertiliser at better prices. These concerns led farmers to treat credit not as a route 
into commercialisation but another risk they take to get inputs for subsistence. 
 
These concerns were probably part of the reason that fertiliser credit groups had not 
totally eliminated the agroecological system. Farmers were still applying compost and 
manure to sambanni fields and both borrowed and bought fertiliser to outfields. Credit 
schemes’ enhancement of yields and their existence alongside this agroecological system 
could be seen as a demonstration of farmers’ ability to combine elements of modernised 
and agroecological soil fertility management strategies. To some extent this resonates 
with Bornstein’s 2014 study that does not challenge the political agroecological view that 
the African Green Revolution is a penetration of capital into the countryside, but 
describes how farmers use the seeds it provides within existing storage and sharing 
arrangements [31]. Nevertheless, the indication that credit schemes are associated with 
lower likelihood of using organics is less positive.  
 
Future pathways 
Credit schemes raise fertiliser use and yield but not commercialisation, possibly because 
farmers are not confident that affordable staples are available through the market for 
purchase with the proceeds of maize sales. They, therefore, largely maintain their low-
risk subsistence strategy, using credit alongside it. If credit schemes reduce the 
prevalence of these existing agroecological mechanisms, they are risky. To be fully 
effective, fertiliser schemes should be combined with strategies to maintain existing 
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organic amendment applications by tackling logistical obstacles to higher application 




This study aimed to explore the relationship between fertiliser credit and farmers’ use of 
organic amendments, thereby commenting on the interactions of modernising and 
agroecological management paradigms. The details of local agroecological soil fertility 
management practice and the roles of organic and inorganic amendments were illustrated 
when detailed spatial field level data were combined with quantitative and qualitative 
socioeconomic information and deep knowledge of the farming system. These data were 
treated with content analysis and binomial logistic regression, finding that fertiliser credit 
schemes increased inorganic input use and yields, but did not enhance commercialisation 
and were less important than existing socio-ecological and spatial factors in influencing 
how organic amendments were used. This demonstrates that fertiliser credit schemes, 
like other modernisation efforts of the African Green Revolution, can and should 
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Table 1: Sampling statistics 
Village Number of farmers sampled Percentage of farmers sampled 
Satani 48 23.4 
Zugu 55 26.8 
Yirikpani 49 23.9 
Tarakpaa 24 11.7 
Ypilgu 29 14.1 
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Table 2: Demographic sample characteristics 
  Mean (±SE)  Median Mode Minimum Maximum 
Estimated age 41.2 (±12.3) 40 30 20 70 
Household 
population 
20.5 (±12.0) 18 30 3 70 
Number of wives 1.5 (±2.2) 1 1 0 4 
Number of children 5.7 (±5.1) 4 2 0 24 
 Household role Frequency Percentage of sample 
Landlord 101 49.3 
Joint or acting 
landlord 
8 3.9 
Landlord’s wife  2 1.0 
Landlord’s brother 22 10.7 
Landlord’s son 53 25.9 
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Table 3: Wealth-related sample characteristics  
Wealth indicator Mean (±SE)  Mode Minimum Maximum 
Number of sheep, goats and pigs 7.4 (±10.4) 0 0 100 
Number of cows 2.6 (±8.4) 0 0 100 
Personal landholding (acres) 7.5 (±6.8) 5 1 72 
Household landholding (acres) 20.0 (±19.0) 20 2 110 
Wealth index 30.6 (±32.4) 22 4 368 
 Frequency Percent 
Owns a bicycle 182  88.0  
Owns one motorbike 65  31.7  
Owns a tractor 4  2.0  
House roofed with zinc 152  74.1  
Has a job other than farming 43  21.0  
 
Table 4: Regression coefficients 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Whether organic matter was 
applied at all (0=no, 1=yes) 
-0.419 0.341 1.510 0.219 0.658 
Total number of bags of fertiliser 
applied 
0.083 0.038 4.666 0.031 1.087 
Sacks of maize yielded per 
household member 
1.109 0.670 2.740 0.098 3.031 
Percentage of maize consumed 
-0.034 0.008 18.049 0.000 0.967 
Percentage of maize sold 
-0.024 0.011 4.700 0.030 0.977 
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Table 5: Characteristics of credit group members and non-members 






Income received from maize sale (Ghana Cedis) 124.42 91.62 0.021* 
Income per sack 52.30 51.30 0.794 
Bags of fertiliser bought 2.06 4.02 0.000*** 
Bags of fertiliser borrowed from sources other than 
credit group 
0.11 0.36 0.333 
Bags of fertiliser used  5.90 4.41 0.000*** 
 
 
Table 6: Farmers’ comments on subsistence and commercialisation 
Percentage of farmers giving each answer to the question ‘is maize a subsistence or a commercial crop?’ * 
N=205 
Maize is generally only sold if some 
remains at the end of the year 
Maize can be sold 
as well as eaten 
Maize is purely a 
subsistence crop 
Maize is purely a 
commercial crop 
70.2 52.9 3.4 0.5 
Percentage of farmers giving each answer to the question ‘will you buy maize this year?’ N=205 
No Maybe Yes 
36.6 49.8 13.6 
*Some farmers gave multiple answers to this open question. The first two responses are not 
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Table 7: Regression coefficients 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Household role (0=not landlord, 1=landlord) 0.316 0.350 0.819 0.366 1.372 
Transport (0=no bicycle, 1=bicycle) -1.180 0.596 3.911 0.048 0.307 
Asset index score 0.024 0.009 6.508 0.011 1.024 
Field location (0=outfield, 1=sambanni) 24.523 0.000 0.151 0.000 6.240 
Group membership (0=not a member, 1=group 
member) 
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Table 8: Farmers’ opinions on credit and fertiliser 




Positive perceptions about credit and fertiliser 
Fertiliser credit improves yields 188 91.7 
Fertiliser credit results in less Striga 6 2.9 
Fertiliser credit improves soil fertility 4 2.0 
Even after taking a loan, farmers benefit 1 0.5 
Ecological concerns  
Fertiliser causes problems when rainfall is low 55 26.8 
Soil fertility decreases in the years after fertiliser application 24 11.7 
Weeds such as Striga appear in the years after application  10 4.9 
Fertiliser can be bad for farmer health 7 3.4 
Logistical concerns  
Inputs arrive late 19 9.3 
Fertiliser is not useful if applied late 14 6.8 
Financial concerns  
Repayments are too expensive 10 4.9 
The farmer would prefer to be self-sufficient in fertiliser supply 10 4.9 
If the crop fails in a drought the farmer cannot repay the debt 10 4.9 
The Millennium Development Agency profits more than farmers do 5 2.4 
Fertiliser is expensive and unavailable 4 2.0 
Some farmers have not harvested maize by the time repayments are 
due 
3 1.5 
Maize market prices are low at the time when repayments are due 3 1.5 
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